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Miguel  Urrutia 
I found the papers analyzing the origins of overindebtedness in a group 
of Latin American countries both interesting and original. I read them 
without the feeling of  “d6jja  vu,”  which now seems inevitable when 
facing publications on the debt problem. 
A reading of  the Latin American case studies and Jeffrey Sachs’s 
overview chapter leads one to the conclusion that an understanding of 
the political economy of  fiscal policy may be a key to understanding 
both the origins of the debt crisis and the policies needed for overcom- 
ing it. The problem of fiscal policy-making in  the region is therefore 
the issue I would like to deal with in these comments. 
Concentrating on that issue, which addresses the area of  national 
policy-making, does not mean, however, that I include myself in the 
camp of  those  who blame the debt crisis exclusively on the policy 
mistakes of the debtor countries. We are all aware that the best solution 
to the debt problem is rapid growth in the OECD countries and en- 
hanced  access  for  Latin  American  exports  to  the  industrialized 
economies. 
I  can even imagine countries conditioning the payment of interest 
on their debt to certain market-opening measures or increases in import 
quotas. Such a bargaining strategy would require broadening the debt 
bargaining process to include not only developed country bankers, the 
multilateral financial institutions, and ministers of finance from debtor 
countries, but  also trade ministers  from indebted and industrialized 
countries. I should imagine that the issue of who sits at the debt bar- 
Miguel Urrutia is the manager of the Economic and Social Development Department 
of the Inter-American  Development Bank. 
212 213  Remarks on Country Studies 
gaining table will be argued with ever greater emphasis by the devel- 
oping countries in the following months. 
Because the relationship between trade and debt is well known, and 
the inconsistency between protectionism and the servicing of the debt 
has been thoroughly explored elsewhere, I would like to concentrate 
on the analysis of national policy responses to the debt crisis. 
The Origins of the Debt Crisis in Latin America 
The Brazilian case study suggests that even before the second oil 
shock, “there were signs of an accumulating domestic disequilibrium 
as the ambitious investment plan was followed. Government expen- 
ditures outran its finance. . . .”  The study shows, therefore, that the 
accumulation of debt was in good part caused by the fiscal deficit. But 
Cardoso and Fishlow also blame the fiscal deficit for the failure of the 
stabilization attempts, including the Cruzado Plan. “The budget deficit 
is central not only to the failure of  the Cruzado Plan, but to the ac- 
celeration of inflation and high real interest rates of the  1981-84  sta- 
bilization period.” 
The Mexican crisis  has even clearer fiscal origins.  As Buffie and 
Krause point out, during the  1977-82  period, Mexico enjoyed  very 
favorable terms of trade and was blessed by the discovery of enormous 
oil wealth. The Lopez Portillo administration simply matched those 
windfalls by an extraordinary increase in government spending. Fiscal 
statistics support their claim. Total real public-sector expenditure in- 
creased by 94.4 percent in four years, climbing from 3 1  .O  percent of 
GDP in  1978 to 41.3 percent in  1981. 
The cause of the Mexican crisis of the 1980s was largely fiscal, and 
the difficulties experienced with the economic adjustment process had 
the same cause. The authors conclude that 
[tlhe De La Madrid administration has not offset higher debt service 
payments and lower oil prices with adequate fiscal adjustment. In- 
stead, limited tax  increases and cuts in  current expenditure have 
been supplemented by a variety of other policies aimed at restraining 
the inflationary pressures created by the large fiscal deficits. . . . In 
imposing high  reserve ratios, in requiring banks to allocate a large 
share of their portfolio to the purchase of various government issued 
assets, in  financing a greater part of  the fiscal deficit through bond 
sales, and in  reducing expenditures to augment the stock of  infra- 
structure capital, a series of  devastating blows have been dealt to 
the profitability of private investment. 
One wonders why governments can do anything except tax reform. 
The other measures affect profits, as would taxes, but taxation seems 
politically impossible. Why? We  can receive some enlightenment by 
looking at the extreme policy disasters of Bolivia. 214  Miguel Urrutia/Anne 0.  Krueger 
I found the paper by Morales and Sachs particularly interesting. The 
only quibble I have with it is that they start their story after the 1952 
revolution.  I am not an expert on Bolivian  history, but I understand 
that the Revolution of 1952 was truly a revolution, and that it destroyed 
a feudal social order. The land reform was radical and effective. The 
depth of the transformation may explain part of the postrevolutionary 
political  instability.  In Europe the revolutionary  replacement  of the 
feudal order by a bourgeois state was also often followed by substantial 
political instability and frequent military governments. 
The post-1952 story, however, rightly emphasizes the pervasiveness 
of an ideology  that assigns the state a leading  role in  development 
policy, in a political context where governments do not have the power 
and organization to tax income and wealth. The contradiction between 
the role assigned to government in the development process and the 
political impossibility of producing income for the government through 
taxation meant that governments of both right and left continuously 
tried to finance a large modernizing state either through foreign debt 
or inflation. 
The interesting question to ask is why in Bolivia, and in other Latin 
American nations, taxation was never really tried as  a source of finance 
for the kind of state that the dominant ideology demanded. 
Some Hypothesis on the Political Economy of Fiscal Policy 
Morales  and Sachs relate  how in  Bolivia governments on the left 
sought redistribution through higher wages and a larger role for public- 
sector workers, while governments on the right sought instead to bol- 
ster favored segments of the private sector through generous govern- 
ment subsidies. What appears to happen is that the middle class political 
and military elites pressure for increased government expediture and 
never consider the possibility of taxing themselves. 
When the power base of a regime is exclusively middle class, taxation 
is unattractive because the easiest group to tax in developing countries 
is employees of  the formal sector. Latin American middle-class ideo- 
logues, therefore, are not fanatics of the income tax or of sales taxes. 
Middle class governments also do not have sufficient bureaucratic con- 
trol of the countryside to tax land directly, so they attempt to do it 
through  import tariffs and price controls. But short of stalinist agri- 
cultural price controls, agricultural price policy is not easily translated 
into central government tax revenues. 
The more traditional politicians, with a rural landlord base of support, 
do not want to tax land since this would mean taxing themselves. They 
cannot, on the other hand, tax the middle class because the army and 
organized labor can be mobilized to pressure the regime against urban 
taxes through urban violence (general strikes or threats of a coup). In 215  Remarks on Country Studies 
summary, regimes whose only base of support is the middle class may 
be unable to tax. Is that the nature of political regimes in Bolivia since 
1952? 
It should be pointed out that if the middle class is defined as  the 7th- 
9th income decile, it includes the military,  organized  labor,  and  the 
bureaucracy. All of these groups are interested in a large state and low 
income and consumption taxes. This is the worst possible environment 
for fiscal policy. It may indeed be that in Bolivia, as in Colombia and 
Venezuela in the  19th century, the object of politics, as the authors 
point out, has been  “the battle of  the ‘ins’ versus the ‘outs’ ”.  The 
state is then viewed as an instrument of redistribution of income within 
the middle class. 
In Mexico, before Echeverria, maybe the political base was broader. 
Certainly  the PRI  had  strong peasant support, which  allowed  it  to 
maintain legitimacy without having to deliver large state benefits to the 
urban classes. The PRI could not achieve a  large proportion of tax 
revenues to GDP, but it could maintain fiscal equilibrium by not ov- 
erspending. As Mexico urbanized, the peasant base became less im- 
portant and internal politics within the PRI became very dependent on 
the distribution  of benefits  within  the state bureaucracy itself.  This 
pressured government expenditure without creating a constituency for 
tax reforms. Also, institutionally, the chances of fiscal equilibrium di- 
minished  when the function of spending was separated from the Se- 
cretaria  de  Hacienda,  responsible  for  revenues,  and  given  to  the 
Secretaria de Presupuesto, only responsible for spending. Significantly, 
the best way to get elected presidential candidate of the PRI has been 
to become head of the spending agency. 
The military governments of Argentina also seem to have had a very 
narrow  middle-class  base. The Peronistas, dominated by the public- 
sector unions, simply represented another faction of the middle class. 
The Colombia Case Study 
There was one case in  Latin America  of  a  country that did  not 
increase its debt excessively  in the 1970s-Colombia.  It also carried 
out at least two wide-ranging tax reforms, and maintained a low budget 
deficit. 
Politics in Colombia have some interesting characteristics, and this 
may  explain the country’s uncommon fiscal  policies.  It  is a formal 
democracy and the political process was more participatory in the 1970s 
than in other nations. In this, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and some of the 
Caribbean countries have greater similarity  to Colombia than to the 
countries studied in the NBER project. In Colombia, the political par- 
ties (in power for 140 years) are multiclass, and rural and urban informal 
sectors are influential in the parties. Finally, the government in 1974- 216  Miguel UrrutidAnne 0. Krueger 
78 had a large rural base of support, and the president had developed 
a strong commitment to promoting development in the rural sector and 
dismantling the import substitution  model of  development. He was 
against subsidizing organized labor and industrialists, was antibureau- 
cracy, and had his urban support among the unorganized who suffered 
most from inflation. In summary, the political base of the government 
was not middle class, and not  suprisingly  middle class income grew 
less rapidly than the income of the poor and the rich in the 1970s. 
The main objective of the government in power between  1974 and 
1978 was to control inflation, and, with this objective, it carried out a 
tax reform in 1974, and, also to control inflation, the government did 
not increase the foreign debt. In contrast, in the early  1980s another 
government, whose political  base  was  largely  the  bureaucracy, in- 
creased debt and government expenditure rapidly. That policy created 
a minor debt crisis in 1983-84,  but Colombia was the only country in 
Latin America that adjusted successfully after 1982. It did it by almost 
wiping out the fiscal deficit in 1984-85,  not only by decreasing expen- 
ditures, but also by increasing taxation. 
The president in  1984-85  had his political base largely among the 
unorganized urban masses. He had little support from the army or the 
upper middle class, and substantial support  from a political class whose 
source of income is politics and not industry or large landholdings. 
In summary, fiscal responsibility may only emerge in the region as 
the basis of support for Latin American governments is diversified. 
Narrow middle  class governments may  be  incompatible  with  fiscal 
equilibrium. 
Conclusions 
The optimistic conclusion of the previous analysis is that the deep- 
ening of democracy that has occurred in the 1980s may facilitate in the 
future a more rational fiscal policy. The lesson, on the other hand, is 
that adjustment policies  must be designed keeping in mind the high 
political cost of policies that affect negatively primarily the politically 
strong middle class. 
The point is not that policies unpopular with the middle class should 
not be adopted. Quite the contrary. The objective should be to design 
components of the adjustment policy that must include tax reform, but, 
at the same time to take measures which will create political support 
for the government from other groups in society. This means the design 
of social investment projects and social safety nets which will develop 
political support from nonmiddle class constituencies. 
It is not prudent to limit adjustment programs  to wage  restraints, 
liberalization of  labor legislation, decreases in  government employ- 
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negatively  affect the politically powerful  middle class.  Some of  the 
democracies in  Latin America have shown that tax reform is viable 
within an adjustment program that generates employment and improves 
the prospects of  the very poor or marginal groups in society. It may 
be that a good criterion for judging an adjustment package is to examine 
whether it includes tax reform and measures which make tax reform 
politically viable. 
Anne 0.  Krueger 
To  provide an overview of  the  country  studies presented  is  a real 
challenge. To focus the discussion, I shall concentrate my remarks on 
two main issues: the origins of the debt problems of  the developing 
countries in  the  1980s, and the  political-economic assumptions that 
seem implicitly to underlie much of our thinking on policy issues such 
as foreign borrowing and debt. 
Origins of the Debt Problems 
There is no doubt that the worldwide recession of the early 1980s, 
coupled with falling commodity prices and rising nominal interest rates, 
exacerbated  the difficulties of  all debtor countries. However,  some 
countries  (e.g.,  Turkey) were  unable  to maintain  debt-service  even 
before  1980, and some (e.g., Mexico) clearly did not encounter diffi- 
culties because of external circumstances. There is no point in asking 
whether domestic policies or worldwide conditions led to the problems. 
In each country the debt problem had a magnitude, and both domestic 
and external factors contributed. The precise quantitative contribution 
of each varied from country to country. 
In a sense, the fundamental question is: When a country borrows to 
finance current-account imbalances' on a continuing basis, is that bor- 
rowing path  sustainable? From economic theory, we  know  that the 
current account deficit equals the excess of  investment over savings. 
When borrowing finances additional investment with a rate of  return 
greater than or equal to the rate of interest at which borrowing takes 
place,  and barring  serious mismatches  between  the timing of  debt- 
servicing obligations and  the  stream of  earning from  the additional 
investment, a current account deficit should be associated with addi- 
tional earning sufficient to finance debt-service obligations. 
This  simple framework permits development of  a taxonomy with 
which  to  analyze the  origins of  the  debt  difficulties of  developing 
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countries. We  note that investment can exceed savings either because 
investment is “high”  compared to “normal”  domestic savings (rela- 
tive to a country’s per capita income level) or because investment is 
“normal”  and domestic savings are low.2 
Case  I: Investment “high”  and in excess of savings; the real rate 
of return on investment exceeds the real interest rate. In this case, debt- 
servicing obligations should be readily met, except perhaps for tran- 
sitory difficulties associated with jumps in  the real  interest  rate (on 
variable-rate debt) or  with worldwide recession. This is the “textbook” 
case of self-financing debt. Among the countries covered in the NBER 
project, Korea seems to fit here: the real rate of return on investment 
was high (estimated to be in excess of 30 percent); and capital inflows 
permitted a higher rate of investment, and therefore, economic growth, 
given Korean savings (which do not appear to have been low relative 
to per capita income, at least  after the mid-1960s  when  borrowing 
started). Indonesia may also be in the group. 
Case 2:  Investment high, savings “normal,” but a low and possibly 
even negative real rate of return on investments. In this circumstance, 
borrowing would not be indefinitely sustainable. Earnings from debt- 
financed projects would increasingly fall short of debt-servicing obli- 
gations and, at some point, further borrowing along this path would 
be unsustainable. A rise in the world real interest rate on variable rate 
debt would certainly accelerate the time at which unsustainability be- 
came evident, if  it did not itself  precipitate  a cessation of voluntary 
lending and an inability to meet debt-servicing obligation. 
Among the countries in the NBER project, Argentina, Mexico, and 
the Philippines arguably fall into this category. A high fraction of do- 
mestic investments had relatively low rates of return, for reasons dis- 
cussed further below. 
Case 3:  Investment normal, but savings “low”  andlor a low real rate 
of  return on investment. Low savings could result either because in- 
centives failed to reflect changing conditions, as in Turkey where do- 
mestic petroleum prices were not increased  significantly after the oil 
price increase of 1973 (so that the private consumption share was un- 
altered at domestic prices but increased  at world prices), or because 
of public-sector behavior, discussed further below. Brazil, as well as 
Turkey prior to 1979, appears to fall in this category. 
Case 4: Investment equals saving. Here there are three sub case^.^ 
a. Savings and investment are approximately normal relative to in- 
come, and the real rate of  return is reasonably  high.  In this cir- 
cumstance (Colombia in the 1970s) the growth rate is satisfactory 
and could have been augmented by borrowing. 219  Remarks on Country Studies 
b.  Savings and investment are “normal,”  but the rate of return is 
low. Growth is therefore slow, but again, no debt problems emerge. 
India probably falls in this category. 
c. Savings and investment are ‘‘low’’ with either a normal or a low 
real rate of return on investments. In this case, growth is sluggish, 
but again, debt is not a problem. Burma and Haiti, among others, 
may fall into this category. 
As these cases indicate, a country can fail to have a debt problem 
and nonetheless have poor economic performance. Conversely an ap- 
parently  satisfactory rate of growth may be possible only because of 
borrowing, which may mask difficulties either with resource accumu- 
lation or resource allocation. 
Case 5: Everything  that can go wrong does. In addition to low do- 
mestic savings and a low real rate of return, the terms of trade dete- 
riorate sharply enough (or crops fail  badly  enough) so that imports 
cannot be reduced as quickly as export earnings fall. In this case, debt 
mounts sharply and no corresponding income streams are generated. 
Among the countries in the NBER project, Bolivia seems to belong 
here. It may simply be an extreme example of case 3, but seems to 
have encountered sufficiently bad fortunes to deserve a special cate- 
gory. Some African countries not included in the NBER project also 
undoubtedly belong in this group. Given earlier economic policies and 
low rates of return, adverse shifts in the terms of trade have been large 
enough to render the problem qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, 
different from those of other heavily indebted countries. 
This taxonomy is, of course, rough, and only  suggestive.  It may, 
nonetheless, provide an organizing framework for diagnosis. To  com- 
plete it, however, it is necessary to analyze the sources of low rates 
of return and/or savings and investment rates. 
Consider low or negative real rates of return first.  How can these 
come about? While there are obviously any number of possibilities, 
two sources appear to have figured prominently: (1) a trade and pay- 
ments  regime  that  provided  distorted  incentives  of  private-sector 
investment4  and (2) inefficient public-sector investment programs. 
That a  highly  restrictive  trade and payments regime can lead  to 
privately  profitable  investment opportunities with a low or negative 
social I-ate of return has been documented in both theory (see Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan 1978) and practice (see Krueger 1978). Further, Brecher 
and Diaz-Alejandro  (1977) have  shown that capital  inflows in  these 
circumstances can have  negative  real  returns to the economy as a 
whole.  Cumulatively, one would  expect debt-servicing  difficulties to 
mount in these circumstances, and one suspects that the trade regime 220  Miguel Urrutia/Anne 0.  Krueger 
was a major contributory factor to the debt-servicing  difficulties of 
Turkey in 1979. 
Likewise, public-sector investments can be highly inefficient. The 
Philippines study cites a nuclear power plant never put into operation, 
and that may be less inefficient than continuing to operate some white 
elephants. Loss-making investments are not infrequent. Mexico’s and 
Brazil’s low rates of return on investment appear to be largely attrib- 
utable to this factor. 
As to determinants of  the savings rate, a significant factor in  the 
1970s was  the failure  of  some governments,  possibly  most  notably 
Turkey,  and  to a lesser  extent  Brazil,  to let  the  domestic price  of 
petroleum  reflect the altered international terms of trade after  1974. 
The result  was that consumption as a percentage of  GNP remained 
relatively constant at domestic prices but rose in  international prices 
by  2  to  3  percentage points. The borrowing  that  offset the current 
account deficit clearly did not generate any earning streams to service 
the debt. 
Public consumption also rose sharply in a number of countries, and 
was not offset by tax increases. In these circumstances increased public 
consumption absorbed public and/or private savings. Debt accumula- 
tion permitted the maintenance of investment levels in the short term, 
but cumulatively, earnings streams were not generated to service them5 
Political Economy of  Government Policy 
In any discussion of debt, the role of government and governmental 
decision features prominently. An important question that arises in this 
connection is the assumptions to be made about governmental behavior. 
Are all actions taken by  governments rational? Do governments, like 
individuals, decide rationally? Are choices deliberate outcomes of ra- 
tional processes? 
In discussions of  the  debt  problem  and  needed  reforms,  implicit 
assumptions about these issues appear. Were exchange rate distortions 
the result of policies deliberately chosen with a full understanding of 
the future consequences? Or, instead, were ideas of the day with respect 
to the infant industry argument and the allegedly low costs of protection 
an important factor? This is not the occasion on which to develop a 
full-blown theory of government behavior. But a few comments seem 
to me to be in order, inspired by the implicit theories that are present 
in some of the papers and today’s discussion. 
First, what is politically infeasible today may not be tomorrow, and 
ideas influence both the range of choice and the feasibility of change. 
It was “politically impossible” to abandon a highly restrictionist trade 
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and the architect of the economic reform has won several elections 
based largely on his economic policies. 
Second, markets respond to government policies and those responses 
often induce political reactions.  Thus, smuggling may persuade poli- 
cymakers to tighten controls or to alter the exchange rate and reduce 
incentives for smuggling. Either way, people respond to  perceived prob- 
lems based on their understanding of the consequences of alternative 
responses. Politicians may fear change, be uninformed as to the benefits 
of  change, and  thus resist. Within  governments there are normally 
competing ideas and interests. But again, the professional knowledge 
of the economist can be important in affecting thinking. 
In this regard,  it is important to ask whether government policies 
“cause” outcomes. It is true, for example, that the Korean government 
“targeted”  exports. But it is also true that those targets were set in 
consultation with exporters whose plans, in turn, were in part deter- 
mined by the real exchange rate and other components of the incentive 
system. Were “targets” responsible for exports, or was there a process 
whereby the desire to increase export earnings (and the realistic ex- 
change rate that accompanied  it) set in motion a selection process to 
induce economically efficient exporters? If the latter, the government 
could still have “targeted,” but the interpretation is quite different. 
More generally, however, policies which have with hindsight turned 
out to be ill advised were often buttressed with justifications  such as 
“infant industry,”  or “import substitution,”  or other ideas of the day. 
While  particular interests might  in  any event have  held  sway, it  is 
nonetheless important to bear in mind that governments are not mon- 
olithic, and that decisions are often the result of a process in which 
conflicting claims are resolved.  In this context, the “legitimacy”  of 
ideas is important. If there are bases on which it can be demonstrated 
that, e.g., the costs of an overvalued exchange rate are higher than the 
opponents of change assert, the likelihood  that action will be taken 
increases. 
There has been learning in the past thirty years. It has come partly out 
of experience,  and especially from the contrast between countries whose 
policies were outer-oriented and those whose policies were inner-oriented. 
It has also come partly out of research results. It is all too easy to  forget 
that the “climate of professional opinion” twenty years ago was much 
more forgiving of the policies that have been so condemned in discus- 
sions today. The role of economists in sanctioning, or at least not con- 
demning, policy mistakes should not be ignored. Ironically, the power of 
ideas is often most underestimated by those whose stock in trade it is! 
Evidence such as that coming out of the NBER project should further 
the progress of ideas. There is fear of policy reform, beyond that which 222  Miguel Urrutia/Anne 0. Krueger 
would appear warranted based on the experience of past reform efforts. 
The gains are usually underestimated and the losses overestimated. In 
the Korean case, the benefits came very quickly. As other reforms, 
such  as the  Turkish,  prove  less injurious  and  more  beneficial  than 
expected, it  is to be hoped that knowledge will  once again facilitate 
the adoption of policies leading to higher levels of economic and po- 
litical welfare. 
Notes 
1. For expository simplicity, I ignore other techniques of financing current 
account deficits such as running down foreign exchange reserves (because that 
path is unsustainable in the longer term) and direct foreign investment (because 
it was not a major factor in the debt difficulties of the 1980s). 
2. It could, of course, be that investment was high and savings low. Among 
the countries covered in the NBER project this does not seem to have been 
the case. 
3.  Ignore the case where savings and investment are “high”  and the real 
rate of return on investment is  high.  This is probably the Japanese case and 
Korea may have entered this group in  1986. 
4.  It should be noted that one cannot necessarily identify the source of the 
problem with the category (private or  public) of the borrower. Any government 
confronting a fiscal deficit can either borrow abroad or it can borrow domes- 
tically.  If it does the latter and drives up the domestic rate of interest, private 
firms will be induced to borrow abroad. This mechanism seems to have been 
deliberately employed in Brazil, on  the theory that lenders would provide more 
favorable terms to private than to public borrowers. 
5. Note that there are two transfer problems associated with public-sector 
debt servicing: raising revenue domestically and buying foreign exchange. The 
revenue problem is  apparently more acute in  countries where fiscal deficits 
were financed with foreign borrowing, while the foreign exchange problem has 
probably been more acute in instances where the foreign trade regime led to 
low rates of return on investments. 
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